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Abstract
We study a firm which serves two unequally-sized markets and must choose
where to locate its first production plant, and whether to open a second plant to
serve the other market through local sales rather than exports. An exporter pays
taxes only to the country where it locates its single production plant. A double-
plant multinational pays taxes in both countries, but may shift taxable profits
across countries, at a cost. We show that the usual proximity–concentration trade-
off between fixed and trade costs is modified, depending on both the average tax
of, and the tax difference between, the two countries. Moreover, in contrast to a
standard result of the FDI literature, we find that increased market size asymme-
try may make it more likely that the firm engages in horizontal FDI. From a global
welfare viewpoint, it is always desirable to control the firm’s profit shifting when
the multinational structure is taken as given. However, the fact that the firm may
react by changing its production structure may be a reason not to control profit
shifting activities.
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1 Introduction
Horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) has become a major policy issue in the past
decades, as multinational firms carry out growing proportions of international economic
activity (according to the OECD, around 60% of international trade involves trans-
actions between two related parts of multinationals). The empirical evidence indicates
that FDI by multinationals grew rapidly in the last 15 years of the 20th century, far out-
pacing the growth of international trade among industrialized countries. Foreign-owned
multinationals employ 1 worker in every 5 in European manufacturing and 1 in every 7
in US manufacturing; they sell 1 euro in every 4 of manufactured goods in Europe and 1
dollar in every 5 in the US (OECD, 2001). Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that
industries characterized by scale economies and imperfect competition are dominated
by this kind of firms.1
Firms engaging in horizontal (or vertical, for that matter) FDI own fiscal entities
at different locations and are, thus, capable of shifting profits from high- to low-tax
locations. The existence of profit shifting through various mechanisms, such as royalty
payments, transfer price manipulation and dividend remittances, is widely documented
(see Hines, 1999, for a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature). A recent pa-
per by Clausing (2003) uses explicit observations of both intrafirm and non intrafirm
(market) prices of US international trade. She concludes that export (import) intrafirm
prices do increase (decrease) with the tax rate of the destination (origin) country as
compared to the market ones. Both the OECD (1995, 1998) and the European Com-
mission (1992, 1998) have issued documents reacting to the widespread phenomenon of
profit shifting.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the firm’s choice on how to serve a foreign market
has been treated in the literature by the so-called “proximity–concentration trade-off”.2
The trade-off states that serving foreign markets through local production is a good
option under high trade costs, whereas concentrating production in just one location
and exporting to the other markets is the best option when fixed set-up costs (e.g.
building the factory, buying machines, training workers, etc.) are high.3
Arguably, one of the key factors influencing the firm’s choice between trade and
fixed costs to operate abroad is the market size. Indeed, a general result from the FDI
literature is that horizontal FDI is more likely to occur when GDP (a good proxy for
1These stylized facts are documented and discussed in Markusen (1995), Markusen and Venables
(1998), and Barba Navaretti et al. (2004).
2See, for example, Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1993, 1997), and Markusen and
Venables (2000). More recently, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) have emphasized the role of
intra-industry firm heterogeneity - in terms of productivity differences - in explaining the structure of
international trade and investment when firms face a proximity-concentration trade-off.
3Similarly, the studies which put forward the “tariff-jumping” argument for FDI show that tariffs
increase the cost of exports for the firm, thereby encouraging FDI - relative to exports - in the tariff-
levying country. See Caves (1996, Ch. 2) for an excellent survey on this line of research.
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country or market size) is more similar across countries.4 Several empirical papers,
including Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Head and Mayer (2002), show a robust
positive relationship between market size and the likelihood to attract FDI. On the
other hand, Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2004), who analyze OECD countries’
tax-setting behavior over the period 1982-1999, find that country size (as measured by
GDP) positively affects statutory corporate tax rates; Baldwin and Krugman (2004)
obtain a similar result for average corporate tax rates. Moreover, there is extensive
evidence that the corporate tax rate of the host country has a negative and significant
impact on inward FDI (see, e.g., De Mooij and Ederveen (2002) for a synthesis of
empirical studies based on EU data). If we put such empirical findings together, it
follows that large countries are more likely to benefit from direct investments by foreign
firms but also to set higher corporate tax rates which, in turn, should discourage foreign
firms from investing there.
The theoretical literature has analyzed the relationship between firm location and fis-
cal policies mostly using single-plant firms. The notable exceptions here are the works by
Behrens and Picard (2007) and by Bucovetsky and Haufler (2007). Behrens and Picard
(2007) set up a symmetric two-country tax/subsidy competition model which builds on a
New Economic Geography general equilibrium framework. They show that competition
for mobile firms can be weakened when firms are allowed to establish an additional plant
abroad rather than simply relocate production across countries. Namely, if trade costs
are high relative to the cost of capital, only double-plant firms exist in the economy so
that the tax base becomes immobile. In that case, governments may actually tax away
firms’ organizational rents, which lessens the incentives for harmful tax competition.5
Bucovetsky and Haufler (2007), instead, use a traditional public finance approach to
deal with capital tax competition when firms can endogenously choose their organiza-
tional structure and governments can commit to long-run tax discrimination policies
between multinational and domestic firms. The main trade-off for governments is that
granting tax breaks to multinationals softens tax rate competition, but it also provides
incentives for firms to choose a multinational structure with the aim of enjoying tax
savings. Interestingly, when the firms’ organization choice responds elastically to tax
breaks, a small coordinated increase in the tax preferences in favor of mobile firms may
relax tax rate competition, thereby increasing global welfare.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no effort has been made to study the
interaction between the proximity–concentration trade-off and fiscal motivations when
the possibility of profit shifting is explicitly taken into account. This paper aims at
building the bridge between these two strands of the literature, i.e., to study how dif-
ferent profit tax rates influence the location–organization choice when multinationals
may manipulate taxable profits in their favor, and countries’ markets differ in size. Dif-
ferently from us, Behrens and Picard (2007) do not take into account the possibility
of asymmetric market size and profit shifting. By contrast, in Bucovetsky and Haufler
4See, e.g., Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000).
5Baldwin and Krugman (2004) get a similar result in a model with single-plant firms and asymmetric
countries, where the bigger one ends up taxing away the firms’ “agglomeration rents”.
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(2007), choosing a multinational structure confers tax savings to the firm at no cost,
i.e., they do not model - as we do - an optimal tax avoidance decision taken by mobile
firms. Moreover, they focus on the tax breaks versus fixed costs trade-off for the firm,
while we consider both trade and tax savings stemming from horizontal FDI. However,
both Behrens and Picard (2007) and Bucovetsky and Haufler (2007) endogenize fiscal
policy decisions, which we take as given.
To this end, we develop a model where two countries of asymmetric market size
levy corporate taxes on the profits generated within their borders and do not allow the
firm to deduct its investment (fixed) costs from the corporate tax base. A monopolist
must decide on whether to serve the two markets locally, i.e., with two local production
plants (a multinational structure) or to set a production plant in one market and serve
the other through exports (an exporter structure).6 The trade-off here is that building
a second production plant entails a fixed set-up cost, while serving the foreign market
through exports involves positive trade costs. The fiscal policy affects the two production
structures differently: an exporter pays taxes on its overall profits just in the country
where its (unique) production plant is located; a multinational, instead, pays taxes
to different national tax authorities, which possibly levy unequal tax rates. Hence,
becoming multinational allows the firm to shift taxable profits - at some cost - to the
low-tax country. By contrast, being an exporter which operates in the low-tax country
can represent an indirect way of minimizing tax liabilities on worldwide profits. We
analyze how the firm’s location–organization choice depends on the tax rates set by the
two countries, on market size asymmetry and on the ability to shift profits.
Our theoretical set-up is based on the literature about policy competition for FDI
under imperfectly competitive markets, country-size asymmetries and trade costs.7 This
line of research develops from the contribution by Haufler and Wooton (1999), who
analyze tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-
owned monopolist. The existence of positive trade costs separating the two countries
entails a location advantage in the larger market. As a result, the big country “wins”
the competition for FDI, and it may even do so while imposing a positive (lump-sum)
profit tax on the foreign firm (rather than subsidizing it). Ferrett and Wooton (2005)
extend the previous model to a two-firm homogeneous good set-up and conclude that
tax competition under (Cournot) duopoly does not create a “race to the bottom” in
corporate tax rates. Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) introduce a local firm in the big country
competing with the foreign investor for the regional market, while there are no local
competitors in the small country. An interesting result is that aggregate welfare (the
6We abstract here from “vertical” FDI involving fragmentation of the firm’s production process
across countries. See, e.g., Markusen (2002, Ch. 9) for a discussion of this form of FDI.
7The baseline perfectly competitive Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)’s model has been extended for
the case of asymmetric size countries by Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). Both identify a “small
region advantage”, whereby the smaller country sets a lower tax, thus hosting a disproportionate share
of firms and achieving the higher per-capita utility level. The traditional public finance approach,
however, seems to be more appropriate when dealing with competition for portfolio investments rather
than FDI since trade costs are typically not accounted for.
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sum of regional welfare and the investor’s profits) rises whenever the introduction of
policy competition leads to a change in the investor’s location decision. Finally, Haufler
and Wooton (2006) study competition between a union of two countries and a third
potential-host country. Countries’ willingness to attract FDI stems from trade costs’
saving, which are lower within the union than between the union and the outside country.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 looks at the location–organization choice under asymmetric taxation, while
Section 4 illustrates the main forces at work by focusing on two special cases, namely,
symmetric countries and no fixed costs. Section 5 is devoted to the impact of profit
shifting, whose desirability, from the total welfare viewpoint, is analyzed in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We develop a partial equilibrium trade/location model in which a firm operates as a
monopoly supplier of some final good in two countries (or regions) of different size.8
The firm faces exogenous corporate tax rates and has to choose the most profitable way
to serve the two markets. In line with Haufler and Wooton (1999), we assume that there
is a single consumer in country A and n > 1 identical consumers in country B. Hence,
without loss of generality, country A (resp., country B) represents the “small” (“large”)
market for the final good. Namely, the firm faces the following linear demands in the
two countries:
q
A
(p
A
) = α− p
A
, q
B
(p
B
) = n (α− p
B
) , (1)
where q
i
and p
i
are the quantity and the consumer price prevailing in country i’s market,
i = A,B.
The firm has to make both a location and an organization choice. In other words, we
let the firm decide where to locate its first - and possibly unique - production plant at a
fixed cost, f . The final good is then produced at a constant marginal cost, w. Without
loss of generality, we normalize f = w = 0. Moreover, the firm has to choose whether
to export the final good to the other country or to engage in horizontal FDI, opening
a second production plant abroad. When the monopolist chooses the former option,
we shall refer to it as a “single-plant exporter” (denoted Si, with i = A,B depending
on production plant’s location); otherwise, we call it a “double-plant multinational”
(denoted m). Shipping the final good to the other country entails a per unit trade cost
τ > 0.9 Opening a second plant abroad instead implies a fixed cost F ≥ 0.10 We
8Horstmann and Markusen (1992) suggest that monopoly emerges as an equilibrium market struc-
ture when firm-specific fixed costs (e.g., R&D investments) are high enough to make entry by a second
firm unprofitable.
9Positive trade costs are needed to separate the two markets, so that the location decision of the
firm has real implications. Indeed, if trade costs were zero, operating profits of a single-plant exporter
would be the same independently of where the firm locates its unique production plant.
10Our model would be unchanged if we allow the fixed costs of the second plant to be either smaller
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follow the empirical evidence by Head and Mayer (2000) and Haskel and Wolf (2001)
and postulate that the firm is able to segment its market, i.e. to set different consumer
prices for the same final good sold in different markets. We denote by q
ij
and p
ij
the
quantity sold and price set for the final good produced in country i for country j’s
market. Hence, operating profits of a single-plant exporter located in country i are
given by
p
ii
q
ii
+ (p
ij
− τ)q
ij
, i, j = A,B, i 6= j. (2)
On the other hand, a multinational serving each market through local sales has
operating profits of
p
ii
q
ii
+ p
jj
q
jj
− F, i, j = A,B, i 6= j. (3)
Substituting the market demand functions (1) into (2) and (3) and differentiating
yields profit-maximizing consumer prices for each location–organization choice by the
firm11
p∗
AA
= p∗
BB
=
α
2
and p∗
AB
= p∗
BA
=
α + τ
2
.
Accordingly, profit-maximizing quantities are given by
q∗
AA
=
α
2
, q∗
AB
= n
(α− τ)
2
,
and
q∗
BB
= n
α
2
, q∗
BA
=
α− τ
2
,
which lead to the following equilibrium operating profits
α2
4
+ n
(α− τ)2
4
for SA (4)
n
α2
4
+
(α− τ)2
4
for SB (5)
α2
4
+ n
α2
4
− F for m. (6)
In order to have positive exports, we suppose that trade costs do not exceed the
consumers’ maximal willingness to pay for the final good, i.e., α > τ . In what follows,
we also let
H ≡
α2
4
> 0 and L (τ) = L ≡
(α− τ)2
4
> 0
denote operating profits from local sales (“High”) and from exports (“Low”), respec-
tively.12 The monopolist earns higher profits by selling its product locally than by
or larger than those needed to operate the first one, i.e. by letting F = ξf , with ξ ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. In
the former case, namely for ξ ∈ [0, 1), we say that there exist firm-level scale economies. In the latter,
i.e. for ξ > 1, we have firm-level scale diseconomies.
11It is a straightforward exercise to show that the firm’s pricing decisions do not depend on corporate
profit tax rates.
12Note that ∂L (τ) /∂τ < 0, meaning that lower trade costs lead to higher operating profits from
exports. Moreover, we have that L (0) = H.
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exporting it due to trade costs savings (H > L and nH > nL as long as τ > 0). We
define the operating profit differential as13
∆(τ) = H − L(τ) ≥ 0
However, we cannot say a priori whether operating profits from local sales in the
small country’s market (H) are higher than operating profits from exports to the large
country’s market (nL). Indeed, we have that
H > nL ⇐⇒ n <
α2
(α− τ)2
,
meaning that if the difference in country size (n) is small enough and/or trade costs (τ)
are sufficiently high, the former are likely to be higher than the latter, i.e. H > nL.
2.1 Location and organization choices
In the absence of corporate profit taxes, the optimal location and organization choices by
the firm are easy to determine. The location decision depends on the difference between
the profits it can realize by locating in one of the two countries and exporting to the
other one. Using (4) and (5), a single plant exporter always prefers to locate in the
big country, as the profit gain of serving the small market locally rather than through
exports is equal to (n− 1)∆ (τ) > 0, and is positively related to the level of trade costs.
In the absence of trade costs, the firm would be indifferent between locations, despite
the size difference.
The firm’s organization decision is thus driven by the difference between the profits
of a single-plant exporter from country B and those of a double-plant multinational,
i.e., using (5) and (6), F − ∆ (τ). From this, it follows that the firm operates as an
exporter from the big country if F > ∆ (τ), i.e., if the fixed costs it has to incur to open
a second plant are sufficiently high and/or trade costs are low enough. This result is a
simple restatement of the well-known proximity-concentration trade-off.
2.2 Corporate profit tax rates and profit shifting
We now consider a situation where each country i = A,B imposes a tax rate ti ∈ [0, 1]
on the firm’s profits. We further assume that no country allows the firm to deduct its
investment (fixed) costs from the corporate tax base.14
13To ease the notation, we will sometimes use ∆ instead of ∆ (τ) in what follows. Note also that
∂∆(τ) /∂τ > 0, i.e., the operating profit differential gets larger for higher values of trade costs.
14Allowing for cross-country differences in the deductibility of investment costs from the corporate
tax base would introduce a second fiscal policy instrument at the government’s disposal. Haufler and
Schjelderup (2000) show that, in the presence of profit shifting, optimal corporate tax systems call for
an incomplete - rather than a full - deductibility of investment expenditures as this allows governments
to lower tax rates and reduces the incentive for the firm to shift profits abroad.
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The introduction of corporate profit taxes affects both location and organization
choices by the monopolist in a non-trivial way. We assume that international taxation
follows the “source” principle, i.e. profits are taxed where they are generated. Keen
(1993) argues that the effective taxation of multinationals is source-based, even though
tax codes may stipulate differently.15 This implies that the overall profits of a single-
plant exporter with its production plant in country i are taxed at the rate ti. Hence,
since price and quantity choices are independent of taxes, equilibrium after-tax profits
of an exporter whose unique production plant is located in country A or in country B
are given, respectively, by:
ΠSA = (1− tA) (H + nL), (7)
ΠSB = (1− tB) (nH + L). (8)
As an example, take an Italian shoes producer undertaking the entire production
stage in Italy and selling a part of it (incurring trade costs) to a French reseller. The
profits thus earned are taxed at the corporate tax rate prevailing in Italy. Instead, the
Italian shoes producer may decide to build a second production plant in France, serving
both the Italian and the French market through local sales and saving on trade costs.
In that case, it has to pay taxes in both countries but it may (at a cost) shift taxable
profits across the two.
We let Πmi denote the profits actually realized by the multinational at each location
i, and pimi represent the profits declared to tax authorities in country i, i = A,B.
The double-plant multinational has to declare the totality of its worldwide profits, i.e.
pimA + pi
m
B = Π
m
A + Π
m
B , but declared and actual profits in one country need not coincide.
In particular, ΠmA −pi
m
A = pi
m
B −Π
m
B , meaning that we allow for “tax avoidance”, but not
for “tax evasion”. The profit-shifting costs are increasing in the difference between the
profits realized and those declared, and may involve expected fines, or hiring tax experts
in order to conceal any profit misdeclaration.16 They depend on an exogenous parameter,
γ, which reflects governments’ intensity in controlling tax avoidance by multinationals.
Alternatively, a lower γ may represent a more mobile tax base. In addition (in the
spirit of Hines and Rice, 1994, and Huizinga and Laeven, 2006), we account for the
fact that the firm’s accounts have to be less distorted to accommodate profit shifting if
realized profits are large, by assuming that the costs are proportional to the percentage
of shifted profits. If, for instance, the multinational shifts profits through transfer price
manipulation, the same variation in transfer prices allows it to shift a larger amount
of profits out of (or into) a market where it sells more units of a good. Under the
alternative specification with costs depending on the difference between realized and
declared profits, the firm shifts the same amount irrespective of the level of realized
15Implicitly, we assume that the sales-office is a legal resident of the foreign country, i.e. it is a
subsidiary (rather than a branch) of the multinational firm. See Gresik (2001, footnote 20) for the
different tax treatment of branches and subsidiaries.
16See, e.g., Swenson (2001), Kind, Midelfart Knarvik and Schjelderup (2004), Peralta, Wauthy and
van Ypersele (2006), and Amerighi (2007).
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profits. This would be in contradiction with the empirical findings stating that large
markets offer more profit shifting opportunities than small ones.17 More specifically,
when country i is the high-tax country so that the multinational is willing to shift part
of its realized profits to country j, this entails a cost
C (γ, pimi , Π
m
i ) =
γ
2
(Πmi − pi
m
i )
2
Πmi
, i = A,B, γ ≥ 0.
Since multinationals are allowed to choose the level of declared profits in response to
the tax rates set by the two countries, the introduction of the profit shifting possibility
does not change the pricing decisions of firms.18 Hence, operating profits are given by
ΠmA = H and Π
m
B = nH, and the multinational’s after-tax profits can be written as
follows:
Πm = ΠmA + Π
m
B − tipi
m
i − tj
(
Πmi + Π
m
j − pi
m
i
)
−
γ
2
(Πmi − pi
m
i )
2
Πmi
− F, i, j = A,B, i 6= j.
Optimizing with respect to the level of declared profits in country i, we obtain
Πmi − pi
m
i
Πmi
=
ti − tj
γ
which means that the multinational declares higher profits in the low-tax country, while
no profit shifting takes place when the two countries tax corporate profits at the same
rate. In order to ensure that the multinational declares positive profits in both countries,
we assume that γ > 1.19
Substituting for ΠmA = H and Π
m
B = nH, we can rewrite optimal declared profits in
the two countries as
pimA = H
(
1−
tA − tB
γ
)
> 0, pimB = nH + H
(
tA − tB
γ
)
> 0 if tA > tB (9)
and
pimA = H + nH
(
tB − tA
γ
)
> 0, pimB = nH
(
1−
tB − tA
γ
)
> 0 if tB > tA. (10)
17For instance, Hines (1999, p. 318) claims that “the return to clever tax-avoiding activity is a
function of the amount of income that can be reasonably rerouted”. Gresik (2001) also points to the
idea that larger-scale operations offer more room for profit shifting activities, although focusing on firm
(rather than market) size.
18A straightforward envelope argument yields this result.
19Without this assumption, the multinational may declare negative profits in one country, which
would then be subsidizing the multinational at the announced tax rate, an unrealistic situation we wish
to avoid. In Section 4, we relax such an assumption by analyzing the limit case where profit shifting is
costless, i.e. γ = 0.
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Therefore, equilibrium after-tax profits of a double-plant multinational are given by
Πm = (1− tA) H + (1− tB) nH − F +


H (tA−tB)
2
2γ
if tA > tB
nH (tA−tB)
2
2γ
if tB > tA
(11)
where the last term represents the net gain to shift taxable profits in response to a tax
differential across the two countries.
3 Taxes and the location–organization choice
We now look in detail at the firm’s choice in the presence of profit tax rates, under the
possibility of profit shifting. It is useful to think of the firm’s decision as a two-stage
one, whereby the firm starts by choosing where to locate its first production plant (the
location decision) and then decides on whether to open a second plant in the other
country (the organization decision). This is an artificial timing which will, however,
help us to understand the main forces at work in our model.
3.1 Location choice with taxes
When deciding where to locate its unique production plant, the firm compares (7) with
(8), yielding
ΠSB − ΠSA = (n− 1) ∆ (τ) + tA (H + nL)− tB (nH + L) .
This implies that
ΠSA > ΠSB ⇐⇒ tA < t
AB (tB) < tB
where
tAB (tB) ≡ tB
nH + L
H + nL
−
(n− 1) ∆ (τ)
H + nL
(12)
identifies the corporate profit tax rate country A can set such that the firm is indifferent
between locating its unique production plant in the small or in the large country. In
what follows, we will refer to condition (12) as the “location” condition. It is noteworthy
that tAB (tB) < tB for any tB ∈ [0, 1), i.e., the small country must offer a tax advantage
to be able to attract the firm. As a consequence, there is a range of (low enough) big-
country tax rates such that the small country can never attract the firm. In spite of
that, the small country may now be able to induce the monopolist to locate there while
this is not possible in the absence of taxes.
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3.2 Organization choice with taxes
We now let the firm decide on whether to open a second production plant in the other
country. In so doing, the firm incurs a fixed cost, but it saves trade costs on its foreign
sales. Moreover, it can benefit from shifting profits to the more lightly taxed location.
We now highlight the main trade-offs which are relevant for the monopolist’s optimal
location–organization choice for the general case with γ > 1. The exact expressions for
the tax thresholds are derived in the Appendix.
When choosing its location, the firm prefers to operate as a single plant from the
small country only when tA is sufficiently smaller than tB. This implies that, when it
comes to the organization choice, the firm may decide to operate as (i) a single plant
from country B or a multinational shifting profits from A to B, when tA > tB; (ii)
a single plant from country B or a multinational shifting profits from B to A, when
tB > tA > t
AB; or (iii) a single plant from country A or a multinational shifting profits
from B to A, when tA < t
AB. The relevant regions in the (tB, tA)−space are identified
as I, II, and III, respectively, in Figure 1. Region II will play an important role in our
analysis, in the sense that the firm opens its first plant in the high-tax country, which
is also the biggest market, so that the second production plant can be used as a profit
shifting device. We shall refer to this case as fiscally-advantageous second plant. On the
contrary, in regions I and III, the second production plant is opened in the high-tax
country and the firm shifts profits back to the country where it locates the first plant. In
these cases, for sure, the second production plant is not opened due to fiscal motivations.
We shall refer to these latter situations as fiscally-disadvantageous second plant.
Figure 1: The organization choice with taxes
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tA
tB
-
1
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SB or
SB or
SA or
m (piA > ΠA)
m (piA > ΠA)
m (piA < ΠA)
I
II
III
Let us look at region I first, where tA > tB. Using (8) and (11), we get
Πm−ΠSB = (1− t) ∆ (τ)− F︸ ︷︷ ︸
modified proximity-concentration trade-off
+ H
(tA − tB)
2
2γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit-shifting effect
− (H + L)
(tA − tB)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax bill effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax difference effect
(13)
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where
t ≡
tA + tB
2
is the average tax rate of the two countries.
In the presence of corporate taxes and profit shifting, the organization choice is
generally driven by two distinct effects: a modified proximity-concentration trade-off,
which relies on the level of taxes, and a tax difference effect, which depends on the
difference in the two countries’ tax rates. The modified proximity-concentration trade-
off weighs down the gain to serve markets locally by the average tax rate, as higher tax
rates reduce the additional net profit from serving markets through local sales rather
than through exports. As for the tax difference effect, we may further decompose it into
a positive profit-shifting component and a negative tax bill one. The former represents
the net gain of the multinational structure from shifting taxable profits out of the high-
tax country. The latter is due to the different taxation of the profits realized in the
small country. With a fiscally-disadvantageous second plant, the profits in the second
market are taxed at a higher tax rate than if the market were served through exports.
We now handle region II, where tB > tA > t
AB. Using (8) and (11), we obtain
Πm − ΠSB = (1− t) ∆ (τ)− F︸ ︷︷ ︸
modified proximity-concentration
+ nH
(tB − tA)
2
2γ
+ (H + L)
(tB − tA)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax difference effect
(14)
where the only dissimilarity with respect to (13) is the tax difference effect. When
tB > tA, profit shifting goes in the opposite direction, i.e., from B to A, and it is of a
higher magnitude than before. Moreover, we are dealing with a fiscally-advantageous
second plant, so that the tax bill component is positive. Operating as a multinational
allows the firm to pay taxes on high profits (H) at the lowest tax rate (tA) instead of
paying taxes on low profits (L) at the highest tax rate (tB).
Finally, in region III, where tA < t
AB, we use (7) and (11) and we get
Πm − ΠSA = (1− t) n∆ (τ)− F︸ ︷︷ ︸
modified proximity-concentration
+ nH
(tB − tA)
2
2γ
− n (H + L)
(tB − tA)
2
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax difference effect
(15)
The net profit difference is analogous to (13), with tA replaced by tB and scaled up by
n, as the firm decides on the possibility of opening a second plant in the big market.
Since this second plant is fiscally-disadvantageous, the tax-bill effect is negative.
The discussion above allows us to pinpoint the importance of the average tax, on
the one hand, and the tax difference, on the other. We summarize our findings in the
two following Propositions.
Proposition 1 (Average tax and organization choice) The gain of the monopo-
list from opening up a second plant to serve the foreign market is decreasing in the
average tax of the two countries.
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The firm prefers to serve markets through local sales because that allows it to save
on trade costs; however, since that gain is eroded by taxes, a higher average tax level
decreases the firm’s incentive to open a second production plant abroad. Such a theoret-
ical result finds empirical support in a recent paper by Buettner and Ruf (2007), which
uses a firm-level panel data to study the impact of taxation on the decision of German
multinationals to hold or establish a subsidiary in other European countries or abroad.
In particular, statutory corporate tax rates are found to have a strong negative impact
and turn out to be at least as important as labor cost differences for explaining the
observed location decisions.20 In their words, “a policy directed towards the attraction
of multinationals should care for low levels of [...] the statutory tax rate on corporation
profits” (Buettner and Ruf, 2007, p. 162).
Proposition 2 (Tax difference and organization choice) The gain of the monop-
olist from opening up a second plant is increasing in the tax difference
(i) in the case of a fiscally-advantageous second plant, i.e., when the first production
plant is in the high-tax big country;
(ii) in the case of a fiscally-disadvantageous second plant as long as the tax difference
is large enough and the cost to shift profits is sufficiently low.
Proof. In region I, using (13), the tax-difference effect may be written as g (x) ≡
x
2
(
xH
γ
− (H + L)
)
, where x ≡ tA − tB > 0. It is easy to check that x
H
γ
− (H + L) <
H
γ
− H − L < 0, for all x ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 1, hence g(x) < 0 always holds true in the
relevant tax range. Moreover, ∂g(x)/∂x > 0 for x > γ H+L
2H
, and ∂2g(x)/∂x2 > 0. Since
γ H+L
2H
< 1 if and only if γ < 1 + ∆
H+L
, we have that g(x) is increasing for high x, if γ is
low enough; otherwise, it monotonically decreases for any x ∈ [0, 1].
In region II, both the profit-shifting and the tax bill effects are positive, and the
profit difference is obviously increasing in tB − tA.
In region III, the argument follows by defining x ≡ tB − tA and noticing that
h (x) ≡ nH x
2
2γ
− n (H + L) x
2
= ng(x).
Contrary to what one should expect, it is not always true that the firm decides
to operate as a multinational so as to take advantage of high tax differentials. This
usual argument forgets the endogeneity of the firm’s location–organization choice, i.e.,
it focuses on the case of a fiscally-advantageous second plant (region II). This would
correspond, empirically, to firms headquartered in the high-tax and big market core
European regions (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004), which consider opening a second pro-
duction plant in the low-tax peripheral regions. The tax-difference effect has always
the sign of the tax-bill component, i.e., the firm has an incentive to open up a second
20Similarly, Devereux and Griffith (1998) find that taxes are a quantitatively significant factor in the
choice of location of subsidiaries within Europe for US enterprises.
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production plant only if it does so in the low-tax country. When the firm builds its
second production plant in the high-tax country, the possibility of shifting a part of
its profits does not compensate for the increased tax bill. This is due to the fact that
profit shifting is costly, so that the firm is unable to cancel out the tax disadvantage
of having to pay taxes in the high-tax country. Moreover, with fiscally-disadvantageous
second plants, the tax difference effect becomes more negative, thereby working against
a multinational structure, for higher values of γ (when profit shifting gets more costly),
and also for lower values of τ (the exporter profits taxed at the low tax rate become
larger).
Lastly, we evaluate the impact of market size asymmetry on the firm’s organization
choice. This follows from differentiating (13), (14), and (15) with respect to n, so that
we can state
Proposition 3 (Market size asymmetry and organization choice) In the pres-
ence of taxes and profit shifting, the gain of the monopolist from opening up a second
plant is
(i) not affected by market size asymmetry, in the case of a fiscally-disadvantageous
second plant, when the first plant is in the low-tax big country;
(ii) increasing in market size asymmetry, in the case of a fiscally-advantageous second
plant, i.e., when the first plant is in the high-tax big country;
(iii) either decreasing or increasing in market size asymmetry, in the case of a fiscally-
disadvantageous second plant, when the first plant is in the low-tax small country.
Proof. In region I, using (13), we have that ∂
(
Πm − ΠSB
)
/∂n = 0. In region II,
using (14), we have that ∂
(
Πm − ΠSB
)
/∂n > 0 as the profit-shifting effect is always
increasing in n. Finally, in region III, using (15), we have that ∂
(
Πm − ΠSA
)
/∂n =
(1− t) ∆ + g(x), where (1− t) ∆ ≥ 0, x ≡ tB − tA and g (x) < 0 is defined in the
same way as in the proof of Proposition 2. Hence, the overall impact of n can be either
positive or negative depending on the relative importance of these two opposing effects.
The traditional literature on FDI generally claims that horizontal FDI is more likely
to take place between countries of similar size (Markusen and Venables, 1998; 2000). In
our framework, this means that the firm’s incentive to choose a multinational structure
should be higher as n gets closer to 1. But this need not always be the case in the
presence of taxes and profit shifting. In particular, with a fiscally-advantageous second
plant (region II in Figure 1), the larger is country B’s market relative to country A’s (i.e.,
the higher is n), the more profitable horizontal FDI becomes relative to exports. This is
due to the fact the gain from shifting taxable profits is positively related to the amount
of profits that the firm actually realizes in the big market, which, in turn, increases with
the market size. In the case of fiscally-disadvantageous second plants (regions I and
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III), instead, increased market size asymmetry has either no or an ambiguous impact
on the firm’s choice to become multinational. In region I, the firm locates its first plant
in the low-tax big country and, if it decides to establish a second production plant in
the high-tax small country, it will shift profits from A to B. But the amount of profits
realized in the small country (hence, shifted profits) do not depend on n. In region III,
the firm has the option to set up its second plant in the high-tax big country and shift
profits to the small country. When the net gain of serving the big market locally rather
than through exports (trade cost savings) overrides the negative tax difference effect of
shifting profits out of the high-tax big country, an increase in the size of the big market
relative to the small one will make it more likely that the firm chooses to engage in
horizontal FDI.
4 Two special cases
The combination of the average tax and the tax difference effects implies that the de-
cision to open the second plant abroad depends non-linearly on the tax rates. We now
illustrate this non-linearity by focusing on two simple limiting cases: one where the
markets in the two countries are of equal size, and another where the fixed cost to open
the second production plant is nil. Both situations are depicted in Figure 2.
4.1 Symmetric countries
In order to focus on the rich effects of the tax rates in our setting, we let the equally-sized
countries (n = 1) set unequal corporate tax rates. Not surprisingly, the firm’s decision
is symmetric around the axis tA = tB, i.e., the firm always locates its first production
plant in the low-tax country. The firm’s location–organization choice depends on how
F compares to ∆(τ). Given market size symmetry, the firm opens its first plant in
the low-tax country, so that the second plant is always fiscally-disadvantageous. This
implies, according to Proposition 2, that the tax difference effect is always negative.
Hence, the firm decides to operate as a multinational only when the modified proximity-
concentration trade-off is sufficiently positive. If this trade-off is negative even with a
zero tax rate (the case F > ∆ on the central panel of Figure 2), then the firm never
operates as a multinational.
Let us now look at the left panel of Figure 2. Suppose that the tax rates are
equal, tA = tB. Then, the tax difference effect is nil, and the firm’s organization choice
depends only on the modified proximity-concentration trade-off. For a given value of
F , as t decreases, opening up a second plant abroad becomes more interesting for the
monopolist. An alternative way to interpret this is that there exists a value of t such
that the firm finds it more profitable to pay a non tax-deductible cost (the fixed cost F )
than a tax-deductible cost (the trade cost τ). Let us start from a high equal tax rate
situation where the firm chooses SB (i.e., t > 1−
F
∆
) and let tB decrease (for tA and F
fixed). Then, the increase in the tax difference makes it even less profitable for the firm
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Figure 2: Two special cases
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to operate as a multinational. If, instead, we start from an equal tax rate situation such
that the firm operates as a multinational, the same tax difference effect leads the firm to
switch to a single-plant structure as we let tB decrease. However, further decreasing tB
also decreases the average tax rate and leads the firm to prefer a multinational structure
again. When the average tax is sufficiently low, on the other hand, the monopolist
always opens the second production plant.
The above discussion puts forward the idea that the introduction of taxes, even in a
symmetric-country set-up, changes the monopolist’s decision in an important manner.
For values of F such that the monopolist always operates as a multinational in the
absence of taxes, it may now happen that it decides to become a single-plant exporter.
Furthermore, in a tax-free economy, the monopolist is always indifferent between being
a single-plant exporter from either country since countries are of the same size. This
is no longer the case here and a marginal tax rate difference induces the monopolist to
locate in the low-tax country.
4.2 Additional plants at zero cost
The assumption that there are no fixed costs to open a second production plant abroad
may capture the idea that the firm has a one-time fixed cost (e.g., to develop the product,
market and advertise it) whereas production per se only entails marginal costs related to
the amount of output produced. Notice that the absence of fixed costs does not change
the location condition (12). Moreover, the modified proximity-concentration trade-off
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is always positive, which favors the option of opening a second plant. This also implies
that in the case of a fiscally-advantageous second plant (region II), the firm always
operates as a multinational.
In the absence of taxes, the monopolist would always opt to serve the two mar-
kets from local production plants. This is no longer the case when fiscal motives are
taken into account. Let us look at the cases of a fiscally-disadvantageous second plant,
i.e., regions I and III on Figure 1. Then, both the tax difference and the modified
proximity-concentration trade-off suggest that when both tax rates are sufficiently high
and different enough, the firm does not open the second production plant. The intuition
is the same as in the symmetric case. For a given tA > tB, m dominates SB for low and
high tB, while SB is better for intermediate values of tB. When tA gets low enough, m
is always the optimal organization, for the main advantage of operating as an exporter
from country B, which is to save tax payments in (the high-tax) country A, disappears.
By contrast, when tax rates are equal, the advantage of becoming multinational is to
increase profits in the foreign market by serving it locally rather than through exports,
and this comes at no cost, since F = 0. Hence, whenever tax rates are identical, the
optimal organization is always a multinational one.
5 The impact of profit shifting
In this Section, we analyze in more detail how the possibility of shifting taxable profits
across countries affects the firm’s location–organization choice. Arguably, the profit
shifting ability plays an important role, which we address in the following result.
Proposition 4 (Profit shifting and the location–organization choice) Increasing
the ability to shift profits makes it more likely that a firm chooses the multinational struc-
ture.
Proof. The proof follows by computing the threshold values of F above which the firm
does not open the second production plant and noticing that they are all decreasing in
γ. For the three regions depicted in Figure 1, they are given, respectively, by:
F̂I = (1− t) ∆ (τ) + H
(tA − tB)
2
2γ
− (H + L)
(tA − tB)
2
F̂II = (1− t) ∆ (τ) + nH
(tB − tA)
2
2γ
+ (H + L)
(tB − tA)
2
(16)
F̂III = (1− t) n∆ (τ) + nH
(tB − tA)
2
2γ
− n (H + L)
(tB − tA)
2
The above Proposition shows that corporate taxation introduces a further incentive
for the firm to operate as multinational. Indeed, there are some tax configurations that
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make it profitable to open a second production plant even for relatively high values of
the fixed costs. Not surprisingly, less costly profit shifting increases the tax ranges for
which a firm prefers to build the second production plant abroad.
We now illustrate the firm’s choice in two limiting cases, i.e., when profits can be
shifted at no cost, and when there are no profit shifting opportunities. We begin with
the case γ = 0, which may capture the idea that national tax authorities of the two
countries are particularly lenient with multinational firms and with their tax avoidance
activities, resulting, e.g., from a high concern for consumer surplus relative to fiscal
revenue.
Costless profit shifting does not alter the firm’s location decision, i.e., condition (12)
is still valid. When profit shifting entails no cost, however, the multinational declares
its worldwide profits in the low-tax country and its equilibrium after-tax profits can be
written as
Πmγ=0 = (1−min {tA, tB}) (n + 1) H − F.
When tA > tB, the firm, as a multinational, declares its overall profits in country B
and no profits in country A, and the relevant net profit comparison is given by:
Πmγ=0, tA>tB − Π
SB = (1− tB)∆(τ)− F
When tB > tA, instead, the firm, as a multinational, pays taxes on its worldwide
profits just in country A, and the relevant profit comparison is either with SB or with
SA. In the former case (region II), it is straightforward to obtain
Πmγ=0, tB>tA − Π
SB = (1− tA)(n + 1)H − F − (1− tB)(nH + L)
so that the firm prefers to open the second production plant as long as
tA ≤ t
Bm
γ=0, tB>tA
(tB) = tB
nH + L
(n + 1) H
+
∆ (τ)− F
(n + 1) H
.
In the second case (region III), we have
Πmγ=0, tB>tA − Π
SA = (1− tA)n∆(τ)− F.
Whenever F > n∆ (τ), it never pays to operate as a multinational, for the maximum
a firm can earn by running two production plants instead of one is n∆ (τ), and it arises
in a scenario in which the smallest tax rate is zero and the first production plant is
in the small country. On the other hand, when F = 0, it is always profitable to open
the second production plant and pay taxes on overall worldwide profits in the low-tax
country. We are left with the two intermediate cases 0 < F ≤ ∆ and ∆ < F ≤ n∆. In
this latter case, it never pays to be a multinational declaring zero profits in the small
country. This would happen for tA > tB, in which case the first production plant would
be in B, and the maximum gain to open a second production plant, ∆, outweighs the
cost, F . For lower values of F , i.e., 0 < F < ∆ (τ), instead, both of the profit shifting
directions are possible. All of these possibilities are illustrated in the top line of Figure
3.
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Figure 3: The impact of profit shifting
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We then focus on a situation where the two countries’ governments are eager to
tax the multinational’s profits, and this makes profit shifting so costly that the profits
declared in each country coincide with those effectively realized there, i.e. pimi = Π
m
i , i =
A,B. This happens when national tax authorities of both countries can easily monitor
the multinational’s activities and are thus capable of determining correctly the firm’s
tax liabilities in each country.
Equilibrium after-tax profits of the multinational are thus given by
Πmγ=∞ = (1− tA) H + (1− tB) nH − F.
Once again, the firm’s location decision is unchanged and driven by condition (12).
As for the firm’s organization choice, using (13), (14), and (15), and not surprisingly,
the profit-shifting gain vanishes and the tax difference effect retains only its negative
tax bill component. Hence, the firm’s choice is now driven by the following conditions
Πmγ=∞ ≥ Π
s
B ⇐⇒ tA ≤ t
Bm
γ=∞ (tB) = tB
L
H
+
∆ (τ)− F
H
(17)
Πmγ=∞ ≥ Π
s
A ⇐⇒ tA ≥ t
Am
γ=∞ (tB) = tB
H
L
+
F − n∆ (τ)
nL
(18)
where both tBmγ=∞ and t
Am
γ=∞ are linear functions of tB. It is also straightforward to
check that the three indifference loci, tBmγ=∞, t
Am
γ=∞, and t
AB, cross at tB = 1 − F (nL +
H)/(n∆(H + L)). Based on this intersection point and on the fact that tAmγ=∞ has the
greatest slope, and tBmγ=∞ the smallest, we may easily draw the graphs in the bottom
line of Figure 3, from which it is clear that the monopolist chooses a multinational
organization when corporate profit tax rates are close enough. In particular, the left
panel clearly highlights the trade-off between the average tax and the tax difference: the
lower is the average tax, the higher is the tax difference compatible with a multinational
structure. The center panel displays a case where the fixed cost F is intermediate, hence
the second plant is a good option only when the average tax is sufficiently low. Finally,
the right panel shows that the value of F above which the firm never opens the second
plant, independently of the tax rates, is lower than when profit shifting is costless.
Overall, comparing the top and bottom panels of the Figure shows the expected result
that the multinational structure is more likely when profit shifting is not constrained.
Put otherwise, when profit shifting is impossible, the firm uses a different channel to
lower its overall tax liabilities, namely, concentrate production in the low-tax country.
In such a sense, the decision to operate as a single-plant exporter from the low-tax
country represents an indirect way of shifting the overall corporate tax base.
Armed with the above results on the likely effects of profit shifting on the firm’s
location–organization choice, we now address the desirability of limiting the extent of
profit shifting behavior by multinational firms.
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6 Is profit shifting desirable?
In this Section we look at the desirability to constrain the firm’s profit shifting ability.
The conventional wisdom is that allowing multinational firms to shift their profits to
the lowest-tax country decreases the total tax revenue. Thus, profit shifting is regarded
as a harmful practice from a global welfare viewpoint. We show below that, once one
takes into account the firm’s location–organization choice, it need not be the case.
Suppose that the consumer’s utility function is linear in a nume´raire good and
quadratic in the good supplied by the monopolist, yielding the linear demand we use
in our model. Assume further that governments use tax revenue to finance lump-sum
transfers to consumers. When the firm is owned in equal parts by each of the n + 1
consumers residing in the two countries, it is straightforward to show that the indirect
utility Vi of the consumer located in country i (i = A,B) is given by
VA = consumer surplus + tax revenue + firm’s net profits/(n + 1)
VB = consumer surplus + tax revenue/n + firm’s net profits/(n + 1)
Therefore, we can write total welfare in the two countries as V j = VA + nVB, where
j ∈ {SA, SB, m} denotes the firm’s location–organization choice. Notice that consumer
surplus is simply given by H/2 or L/2, depending on whether the firm serves the market
locally or from a foreign location.
6.1 Constraining a multinational
We begin by considering the case where the firm operates as a multinational. Using
equations (9), (10), and (11), total welfare in the two countries can be written as
V m =
3(n + 1)H
2
− F −


H (tA−tB)
2
2γ
if tA > tB
nH (tA−tB)
2
2γ
if tB > tA
(19)
from which it immediately follows that total welfare increases with the cost to shift
profits, γ. This allows us to state the following result.
Proposition 5 (Profit shifting and welfare when structure is given) When the
multinational structure is given, the optimal policy is to make profit shifting prohibitively
expensive.
The intuition here is simple. Notice that the firm’s tax bill is a pure transfer between
the firm’s owners and the consumers, hence it cancels out in terms of total welfare.
However, the firm bears a cost for its profit shifting activities. For instance, when
tA > tB, the multinational shifts ΠA − piA = H
(
tA−tB
γ
)
from A to B and bears a cost
of H (tA−tB)
2
2γ
, which is decreasing in the cost to shift profits. It is important to stress
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here that one wants to avoid profit shifting because of the cost incurred by the firm, i.e.,
even neutralizing the alleged harmful effect of profit shifting on tax revenue. If we were
to reintroduce this effect by supposing, e.g., that only a fraction of the firm is owned by
the two countries’ residents, then the motivation to limit profit shifting would be even
stronger.
Proposition 5 is derived by supposing that the multinational firm does not modify
its structure in response to a change in the cost of profit shifting. However, we know
from Proposition 4 that as γ increases the firm is less likely to operate as a double-plant
multinational, with the subsequent consumer surplus loss. Hence, taking into account
the firm’s location–organization choice may alter the conclusion about the optimality of
restricting the profit shifting ability. That is the object of the next subsection.
6.2 Constraining a structure-optimizing monopolist
We start by identifying the optimal location–organization choice of the firm if both
governments can collaborate and jointly decide the structure of the firm without altering
its pricing and profit shifting decisions. In that sense, this is a second-best exercise, since
we are not correcting for monopoly pricing distortions.
First of all, it is straightforward to show that it is never optimal to have an exporter
from the small country. Indeed, we have that
V SB =
3
2
(nH + L) > V SA =
3
2
(H + nL)
as long as n > 1 and τ > 0. A straightforward implication is that, if the two governments
were to coordinate their corporate tax policies, they should never choose a pair of taxes
(tB, tA) such that tA < t
AB (tB).
Hence, it all comes down to comparing an exporter from the big country to a multi-
national, which gives
V m − V SB =
3
2
∆ (τ)− F −


H (tA−tB)
2
2γ
if tA > tB
nH (tA−tB)
2
2γ
if tB > tA
(20)
and it is evident that there exists a value of the fixed cost F above which optimality
requires the firm to operate as a single-plant exporter from the big country.
In order to evaluate the optimality of the market outcome, we shall abstract from
the cases when the firm may decide to operate as an exporter from the small country,
i.e., region III in Figure 1, for this can never be optimal. Let F̂ o denote the critical
values of F above which it is not optimal for the firm to open the second production
plant. Using (16) and (20), we obtain
F̂I − F̂
o
I
= −
(
t + 1
2
)
∆(τ) + H
γ
(tA − tB)
2 − (H + L) tA−tB
2
(21)
F̂II − F̂
o
II
= −
(
t + 1
2
)
∆(τ) + nH
γ
(tA − tB)
2 + (H + L) tB−tA
2
(22)
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for region I and II, respectively.
In the Appendix, we show that, when A is the high-tax country (tA > tB), F̂I < F̂
o
I
,
i.e., there is a range of F values under which the firm operates as a single-plant exporter,
when total welfare is maximized under a multinational structure. The intuition here is
as follows. First, notice that the firm’s gain of serving the small market locally is partly
eroded by taxes, and the firm does not fully internalize the total welfare gain because it
does not take into account the consumer surplus variation. Second, we are dealing with
fiscally-disadvantageous second plants, so that the firm faces a cost to open the second
production plant. This tax bill effect does not have any impact on total welfare as it
represents a pure transfer of resources between the firm’s owners and the consumers.
On the other hand, when B is the high-tax country (tB > tA), we are dealing with
a fiscally-advantageous second plant so that the firm faces an incentive to open the
second production plant which does not matter for total welfare. If countries are very
asymmetric in size, we have a range of F under which the firm decides to open the
second production plant, when optimality would require it to operate as an exporter
from the big country. This is because a higher n gives the firms more profit shifting
opportunities, increasing the advantage to open the second fiscally-advantageous plant.
The above discussion shows that the market outcome is, in general, not optimal.
However, the governments of the two countries have a simple instrument to make the
market outcome closer to the optimal one, namely, the cost to shift profits. Interestingly,
this may involve giving more profit shifting opportunities to the firm in order to induce
it to choose the multinational structure when it is optimal to do so.
Proposition 6 (Profit shifting and welfare when structure is endogenous) When
the firm’s location–organization choice is endogenous, it may be optimal to give more
latitude for the multinational to shift profits into the low-tax country. This happens when
the small country sets the highest tax rate, or when it sets the lowest and country-size
asymmetry is not too large.
Such a striking result is consistent with the finding by Bucovetsky and Haufler (2007),
who show that, when the firms’ choice of organizational form responds elastically to tax
preferences, coordinated efforts at reducing tax discrimination between domestic and
multinational firms may decrease global welfare.
7 Concluding remarks and possible extensions
This paper augments the standard proximity-concentration trade-off set-up by introduc-
ing market size asymmetry and fiscal considerations. We show that taking into account
taxes and profit shifting changes the proximity-concentration trade-off non-trivially, de-
pending on both the average tax rate of the countries and the tax difference. Higher
average taxes make it less likely that a firm operates as a multinational. When it comes
to tax differentials, we show that its impact depends on whether the second production
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plant is fiscally-advantageous, i.e., in the low-tax country or fiscally-disadvantageous,
i.e., in the high-tax country. When the first production plant is located in the high-
tax country, we say that the second plant is fiscally-advantageous and tax differences
induce the firm to prefer a multinational structure. This can only happen when the
big country is also the high-tax one and can illustrate a firm located in the (high-tax)
European “core” regions considering whether to open a second plant in the (low-tax)
“periphery”. On the contrary, when the first plant is located in the low-tax country,
then larger tax differences can make it less likely that a firm operates as a multina-
tional. Moreover, in sharp contrast to a standard result of the FDI literature, we find
that increased market size asymmetry may make it more likely that the firm chooses
a multinational - rather than an exporting - structure in order either to benefit from
greater profit shifting opportunities or to achieve important trade cost savings in the
big market.
Since the introduction of profit-shifting costs makes the location–organization choice
depend non-linearly on tax rates, we illustrate the relationship between taxes and the
firm’s choice in two special cases, namely, symmetric countries and no cost to open a
second production plant. The second case is interesting in that it shows that introducing
taxes may lead the firm to keep a single-plant structure even when it is costless to open
a second plant abroad.
We then look at the impact of profit shifting on the firm’s organization decision. Not
surprisingly, the gain to open the second production plant is always increasing in the
ability to shift profits. We then use this fact to show that it may be optimal for the
two countries to give the firm more latitude to shift profits when there is a sub-optimal
number of multinationals in the world.
We conclude with some remarks on possible extensions. Firstly, all our results hold
with a non-linear market demand, as long as the ranking of before-tax profits between
local sales and exports are kept. The profit-shifting cost function can be generalized to
any convex function. The crucial feature is that it generates a gain from profit shifting
which is a convex function of the tax difference. The most crucial step in terms of future
research is to endogenize tax setting by the countries. This exercise proves difficult due
to the non-linearities induced by the profit shifting possibilities. Hopefully, this will
shed light on the welfare effects of such policies and the desirability of some forms of
tax harmonization and/or coordination between countries.
Appendix
Taxes and the location–organization choice
Region I When tA > tB, we solve (13) with respect to tA and find that Π
SB > Πm if
tA is greater than
t˜Bm (tB) = tB + γ −
√
γ
H
√
γH + 2(F −∆ (1− tB))
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where we have eliminated one of the roots of the quadratic equation, which is greater
than 1. The root exists for tB > 1 −
2F+γH
2∆
, and outside this range, ΠSB < Πm for
any tax pair. Moreover, t˜Bm
(
1− 2F+γH
2∆
)
= 1 − 2F+γH
2∆
+ γ > 1. Also, t˜Bm (tB) is a
convex function which attains a minimum at tB = 1−
F
∆
− γH
2∆
+ γ∆
2H
. Finally, notice that
t˜Bm (tB) = tB when tB = 1−
F
∆
. Thus, since 1− F
∆
> 1− F
∆
− γH
2∆
+ γ∆
2H
, t˜Bm (tB) reaches
its minimum above the 45 ◦-line.
Region II When tB > tA > t
AB(tB), we solve (14) with respect to tA and find that
ΠSB > Πm if tA is greater than
tˆBm (tB) = tB +
γ
n
−
1
n
√
γ
H
√
γH + 2n (F −∆ (1− tB))
(where the greatest root is higher than tB, so we have eliminated it). The root tˆ
Bm (tB)
exists for tB > 1 −
2nF+γH
2n∆
and is a convex function of tB which attains a minimum at
tB = 1 −
2nF+γH
2nK
+ γ∆
2nH
. Moreover, tˆBm (tB) = tB when tB = 1 −
F
∆
. Not surprisingly,
tˆBm (tB) and t˜
Bm (tB) cross at this point. In addition, tˆ
Bm (tB) < tB if and only if
tB > 1 −
F
∆
. Given that 1 − F
∆
> 1 − 2nF+γH
2nK
+ γ∆
2nH
, we conclude that tˆBm (tB) is
increasing in the relevant range.
Region III When tB > t
AB(tB) > tA, we solve (15) with respect to tA and find that
ΠSA > Πm if tA is between the two roots defined by
tAm± (tB) = tB −
γL
H
±
1
H
√
γ
n
√
γnL2 + 2H (F − (1− tB) n∆)
These two roots exist if and only if tB > 1−
F
n∆
− γL
2
2H∆
. Outside this range, ΠSA < Πm
for any tax pair. Also, tAm±
(
1− F
n∆
− γL
2
2H∆
)
= 1 − F
n∆
− γnL
2
2H∆
− γL
H
< 1 − F
n∆
− γL
2
2H∆
.
Moreover, tAm+ (tB) is increasing and concave whereas t
Am− (tB) is convex and attains
a minimum at tB = 1−
F
n∆
+ γ(H−2L)
2∆
. Moreover, tAm+ < tB only for tB < 1−
F
n∆
.
Optimality of the market outcome
As regards region I, let m (x, γ) ≡ H x
2
γ
− (H + L) x
2
with x ≡ tA − tB. The function
m (x, γ) is convex and has two zeros, x = 0 and x = γ(H + L)/2H, hence its maximum
value is either 0, if γ(H + L)/2H > 1, or m (1, γ) = H/γ + (H + L)/2, otherwise. Now
H
γ
+
H + L
2
∈
(
∆
2
,−
H + L
2
)
, ∀γ > 1
and since −(t + 1/2)∆ is at most equal to −∆/2, this proves that F̂I − F̂
o
I
.
As for region II, let x ≡ tB − tA ∈ [0, 1] and define the function r(x, γ, n) ≡ nH
x2
γ
+
(H + L) x
2
≥ 0. Notice that r(x, γ, n) ∈
[
0, nH
γ
+ H+L
2
]
. Hence, it may happen that
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F̂II − F̂
o
II
< 0. Namely, there exists a value of n, n˜ (γ) ≡ [H(1+2tA)−L(1+2tB)]γ
2H(tB−tA)
2 such that
F̂II > F̂
o
II
for n > n˜ (γ), and F̂II < F̂
o
II
otherwise.
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